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Black-boxing the Black Flag: Anonymous Sharing Platforms 
and ISIS Content Distribution Tactics  
by Ahmad Shehabat & Teodor Mitew
Abstract
The study examines three anonymous sharing portals employed strategically by the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Sham (ISIS) to achieve its political ends. This study argues that anonymous sharing portals such as Sendvid.com, 
Justpast.it, and Dump.to have been instrumental in allowing individual jihadists to generate content, disseminate 
propaganda and communicate freely while routing around filtering practiced by popular social media networks. 
The study draws on Actor Network Theory (ANT) in examining the relationship between ISIS jihadists and the 
emergence of anonymous sharing portals. The study suggests that, even though used prior to the massive degrading 
operation across social media, anonymous sharing portals were instrumental in allowing ISIS to maintain its 
networking structure in the face of coordinated disruption. 
Keywords: Anonymous sharing portals, Actor Network Theory, black boxing, Islamic State, degrading 
operation, Sendvid, Justpaste, Dump.to.
Introduction
The rise of distributed communication networks has offered new possibilities for the emergence and expansion 
of terror networks. Since its emergence in 2013, the so called Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS)1 managed to 
utilise sophisticated digital media communication technologies to disseminate globally its propaganda content 
and foster communication between its members. In particular, images and video footage aimed to generate fear 
have been successfully broadcasted globally by the ISIS propaganda network. Noticing a correlation between 
the growing spread of ISIS propaganda videos on social media platforms, anonymous sharing portals, and the 
rise of terrorist activity in the Middle East and Europe, in 2015 the US government established countermeasures 
aimed to degrade and hinder the spread of ISIS propaganda online. These efforts included deletion of ISIS 
online content, suspension of social media accounts, as well as hacker attacks against the websites used by ISIS 
affiliates, and were largely successful in suppressing ISIS propaganda across popular social media platforms.[1] 
In a clear effort to adapt to these countermeasures and sustain its information flows ISIS moved the core of 
its propaganda network to other online platforms substituting for popular sites such as Twitter and YouTube. 
These were primarily encrypted communication channels such as Telegram, Signal, and WhatsApp, as well as 
anonymous sharing portals such as Justpaste.it, Sendvid.com and Dump.to. We refer to them as ‘anonymous’ 
because they protected the anonymity of their users and were at the time little known to a wider internet audience. 
It is important to emphasise that ISIS used these channels even before the network degrading countermeasures 
it faced, however at the time they arguably played an auxiliary role in the overall communication strategy of 
1 Also known as IS, ISIL, and Daesh.
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the organisation. 
The aim of this article is to propose an examination of ISIS’s use of these portals as a response to the 
countermeasures against its online propaganda operations. We suggest that anonymous sharing portals such as 
Sendvid.com, Justpaste.it, and Dump.to have been instrumental in allowing jihadi groups to generate content, 
disseminate propaganda, and communicate freely by diminishing the effects of the broad jihadi propaganda 
filtering efforts of popular social media networks. Crucially, while the majority of research attention has been 
concentrated on analysing the role of encrypted communication channels such as Telegram, little attention has 
been paid to anonymous sharing portals acting as black boxes for ISIS-related propaganda. Accordingly, we 
argue that in order to conceptualise the dynamic role played by anonymous sharing portals in the ISIS network 
we can use the conceptual toolkit developed by Actor Network Theory (ANT).
The key value that ANT brings to our analysis is an understanding of networks as dynamic phenomena that 
have to be continuously rebuilt and maintained by the actors performing them. Furthermore, ANT posits that 
both humans and nonhumans are network actors equally entangled in the flow of agency, and focuses on the 
dynamic relations between the entities performing the network. This is of fundamental analytical importance 
as it allows us to understand the agencies and “normative principles […] that build, maintain, and transform 
networks”.[2] Ever since ANT’s particular methodological approach to studying networks was proposed by 
Bruno Latour, its aim has been “to follow the actors […] and describe how they make associations connections, 
relations, and assemblies”.[3] The ANT perspective allows researchers to develop digital methods of high 
sensitivity for an online problematic, leading to the development of “‘natively digital’ research tools that ‘take 
advantage of the analytic and empirical capacities that are ‘embedded in online media”.[4] In the context of 
this paper, the use of ANT therefore signifies an awareness of the complexity of ISIS’s network assemblage, as 
well as a perspective allowing us to conceptualise the role played by anonymous sharing platforms in ISIS’s 
propaganda networks.
Due to their unique characteristics, anonymous sharing platforms play an important role in ISIS’s online 
strategy, demanding a specific framework of analysis. The ease of sharing content and the anonymity of the 
users create a dynamic where platforms act as automated message amplifiers, playing the role of black-boxes 
in the wider information network. Virtually all users on these platforms fall in one of three often overlapping 
roles: they either dynamically produce and aggregate content, act as intermediaries retranslating and curating 
content across multiple platforms, or passively consume the information flowing across the network. In other 
words, the content flowing through these platforms is highly dynamic and visual, lending itself to visual data 
gathering and ethnographic observation. As Christopher Moore has argued, screenshots are a useful research 
method in that context because “as digital tools, they diminish permanence in exchange for malleability and 
performativity. As media objects, they can be dynamically traced across the networks of their dissemination and 
require a re-evaluation of the axioms of cultural production that considers texts independently of experience”. 
[5]
We first examine the broad online effects of the countermeasures aimed at the ISIS propaganda network. Using 
the notion of a black box drawn from ANT, we then examine the relationship between ISIS jihadists and the 
emergence of anonymous sharing platforms. Finally, we look at three anonymous sharing portals in an effort 
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to understand how they could have contributed to ISIS’s information operations.  
The Rise of ISIS on Social Media
Since its appearance in 2013, ISIS quickly gained notoriety as a terror network, arguably due to the savagery 
it demonstrated against its enemies and people under its control. Concurrently, ISIS appeared to quickly 
recognize the importance of digital communication tools in its self-proclaimed goal to establish a global 
Caliphate. Images of savagery were broadcasted virally through social media networks and global media, and 
were clearly intended to frighten enemies and lead to further gains on the ground in both Syria and Iraq. 
Twitter, YouTube and Justpaste were extensively utilized by ISIS to conduct its information operations, for the 
purpose of producing and disseminating propaganda videos for potential recruits and spread its radical views 
among Muslim youth globally. 
The role of social media platforms in aiding terror organizations has been examined extensively by scholars, 
journalists and think tanks.  For example, the former Google CEO Eric Schmitt pointed out that ISIS and 
its supporters are “producing as many as 90,000 tweets and other social media responses every day”.[6] The 
importance of utilizing media by terror networks was highlighted by Philip Sieb and Dana Janbek, who argued 
that media are the oxygen of terrorism.[7] Furthermore, Abdel Bari Atwan argues that the internet helped ISIS 
to achieve its recruiting objectives and territorial ambitions in short time.[8] That is, digital communication 
tools “allow terrorist groups to become regional or even global players […] [they] also allow terrorists to work 
more effectively […] to protect communications”.[9] 
However, the social media activities of ISIS were monitored closely by the U.S and proprietors of social media 
platforms,[10] and were met by a series of countermeasures intended to degrade ISIS’s online presence.[11] 
In our opinion, the efforts to deploy countermeasures against ISIS’s online offensive by the US and anti-ISIS 
powers have demonstrated three distinct phases of development.
Phase one: Degrade and Destroy. The US government requested Twitter and Google to delete ISIS’s active 
accounts on their platforms.[12] This measure resulted in deleting thousands of accounts and messages, in 
effect leading to a global cyberwarfare campaign against ISIS affiliates. 
Phase two: Countering ISIS propaganda. To compete with ISIS propaganda online, the US government directed 
the efforts of the Centre of Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC),[13] which debuted with 
a video production titled “Welcome to ISIS Land”. According to Scott Higham, “the video became a viral 
phenomenon — viewed more than 844,000 times on YouTube — and a cause of significant irritation to its 
target”.[14] In addition, the CSCC launched the “Turn Away Think Again”2 page on Twitter to stop foreign 
fighters joining ISIS and documenting atrocities committed by ISIS jihadists. In return, ISIS launched the “Run 
Do Not Walk to U.S. Terrorist State” page on Twitter to recruit potential members from the West.
Phase three: Hacking and Information warfare.  Part of the less overt efforts at suppressing jihadist propaganda 
online, the hacktivist group Anonymous declared ‘Operation ISIS’. Andrew Griffin suggests that this operation 
2  Now called DOS team, operating in both Arabic and English it produces videos showing the brutality of ISIS and raising awareness among 
Arab and Muslim youth. 
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concentrated its efforts on searching and neutralising ISIS online content on both social media platforms and 
websites using Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks.[15] Known as #Op-ice-ISIS, this operation 
succeeded in paralysing hundreds of ISIS-related channels of information dissemination, such as the ‘The 
Dawn of Glad Tidings’ app (#op_Isis, 2015). This app, according to Jim Berger (2015) was the official mobile 
phone application disseminating the latest news about ISIS operations.[16]
The online war against ISIS has reached a point where the US coalition forces, Anonymous hackers and other 
anti-ISIS actors have managed to seriously degrade ISIS information dissemination capabilities across popular 
social media networks. The consequences of countering ISIS propaganda on popular social media platforms 
enforced ISIS to shift the emphasis of its information operation to anonymous digital portals and encrypted 
communication channels such as Justpaste.it, Sendvid.com, Dump.to, Share.it, Woodvid.com, Archive.org, as 
well as Telegram, WordPress, Pinterest and Tumblr. 
Many scholars have observed the relation between the emergence of anonymous sharing portals and the wide 
spread of terror narratives. For instance, Alvares and Dahlgern have highlighted the role played by web 2.0 
platforms in the pervasiveness of terror narratives by creating space for uncensored violent content.[17] File-
sharing portals, videos, and personal spaces are used to target different audiences, namely, supporters, public 
opinion and enemies. This observation is also corroborated by Klausen, when he argues that the “jihadist 
insurgents in Syria and Iraq use all manner of social media apps and file-sharing platforms, most prominently 
Ask.fm, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Pal Talk, kik, viper, JustPaste.it, and Tumblr”.[18] 
That being said, it is important to note that anonymous sharing portals such as Telegram, Justpaste.it, Sendvid.
com, and Dump.to were already used by ISIS as auxiliary communication channels prior to the degrading 
operation. However, as we aim to demonstrate, coordinated filtering across popular social media forced ISIS to 
switch its primary information operations to these platforms and to leverage them as communication black-
boxes, thus circumventing the primary vector of the campaign against its operations. 
Telegram in particular, largely due to its native support of encrypted one-to-one and one-to-many 
communications, has been widely adopted by ISIS and its affiliates globally following the start of the filtering 
campaign against it in the fall of 2014. The significance of ISIS’ use of the platform lies in the ability to establish 
multi-purpose channels strengthening its propaganda machine. Crucially, this allows for ISIS affiliates, only 
latently connected to the central hubs of the organization, to both receive and share a coherent centralized 
propaganda message as well as establish encrypted communication channels with each other. Such anonymous 
channels therefore act as systems of coordination, message reinforcement, and activity planning. 
A separate analysis by the authors of this paper, published elsewhere, suggests that ISIS-related Telegram 
channels play a critical role in personal communication between potential recruits and the dissemination of 
propaganda encouraging ‘lone wolf ’ attacks.[19] This study, however, focuses on the less known anonymous 
sharing platforms Justpaste.it, Sendvid.com, and Dump.to, used by ISIS in furthering its information operations 
and communication objectives.
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Degrading ISIS Online Activities 
Popular social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are using their terms of service (TOS) to 
exercise control over the type of information produced and disseminated through their networks. For example, 
YouTube’s TOS state in relation to hateful, violent and graphic content that, “it’s not okay to post violent or gory 
content that’s primarily intended to be shocking, sensational or disrespectful. If a video is particularly graphic 
or disturbing, it should be balanced with additional context and information”.3 Jacob Silverman observed that 
YouTube acts robustly when dealing with terror content. It only takes couple of clicks to delete content and 
suspend associated accounts.[20] Under YouTube’s TOS, the platform reserves the right to remove content 
and in some instances, suspend accounts. According to a YouTube spokesperson, “YouTube has clear policies 
prohibiting content intended to incite violence, and we remove videos violating these policies when flagged by 
our users. We also terminate any account registered by a member of a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization 
and used in an official capacity to further its interests”.  
Berger and Strathearn indicated that when it comes to freedom of speech, social media platforms are biased. 
They suggest that these platforms should make it clear that freedom of speech is limited when it comes to 
using their service.[21]  In a similar vein, Twitter governs what is posted against its TOS policies. With rising 
international pressure on these social network platforms, particularly from the US government over ISIS’s 
online materials, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube have acted swiftly and imposed harsh policies targeting 
gruesome content generated by ISIS. Twitter, for instance, waged a ‘Twitter war’ against pro-ISIS accounts and 
managed to suspend many thousands of accounts which resulted in significant degradation of ISIS’ Twitter 
presence.
In their report, The ISIS Twitter Census, Jim Berger and Johnathan Morgan collected Twitter data in an attempt 
to map ISIS’s activities on that platform.[22] The study was based on a sample of 20,000 ISIS supporter accounts, 
and it established, among others, that in October through November 2014 “at least 46,000 Twitter accounts 
were used by ISIS supporters”.[23] The study also revealed that 20,000 confirmed ISIS supporters are residing 
in the territories controlled by the Islamic State. Saudi Arabia was the second-most common location for ISIS 
supporters. In addition, one fifth of ISIS supporters used English and almost three quarters selected Arabic as 
their primary language. It also appeared that the broad countermeasures aimed at degrading ISIS propaganda 
was successful, at least in part because of wide Twitter account suspensions. The authors concluded that the 
mass account suspension strategy – known as “whack-a-mole”— is highly successful as a network degrading 
tool, and that ISIS finds it challenging to keep up with replacing suspended accounts without suffering any 
negative consequences. 
3 YouTube TOS page: https://www.youtube.com/static?gl=AU&template=terms
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Figure 1: A tweet posted by J.M. Berger on 20 September 2014.
In other words, the latter study offers conclusive evidence that when account suspensions are carried out on a 
consistent basis across a range of platforms they have an adverse effect on the targeted network. While Twitter 
has been largely successful in suppressing ISIS propaganda, Silverman suggests that hosting extreme content 
poses long-term challenges for all social media platforms,[24] and that YouTube and Facebook in particular 
must keep updating their tools in order to dynamically trace and report graphic materials disseminated by 
potential terrorists. In this respect, proactive monitoring of platforms and targeted account removals have 
noticeably harmed ISIS’ content distribution and propaganda tactics on social media. 
Interestingly, and in an apparent effort to resist such persistent network degrading operations, ISIS has tried 
to recruit personnel tasked with mitigating the effects of network attacks and sustaining their information 
operation. As Atwan observed in 2015, “most of Islamic state commanders and recruits are tech-savvy; coding 
(writing software programs putting information in html) is as familiar to them as their mother tongue. Most of 
the digital caliphate business is conducted online, from recruitment to propaganda to battlefield strategy and 
instructions”.[25] ISIS members and sympathizers have specifically targeted unpoliced, anonymous, and safe 
sharing platforms allowing the anonymous dissemination of uncensored content. Often, such platforms are 
also relatively obscure and unknown to the wider public, a factor contributing to their anonymity.
Ironically, and in a development reminiscent of the network-centric warfare theories of John Boyd, the overall 
success of the strategy of degrading any overt social media presence by ISIS appears to have led to the rapid 
changing of media dissemination tactics by ISIS, and the fast adoption of anonymous alternatives. Specifically, 
it appears that the ISIS switch to anonymous and obscure alternatives to popular social media platforms was 
made possible through the adoption of storage and sharing portals such as justpaste.it, dump.to, sendvid.com, 
archive.org, dailymotion.com and liveleak.com. As John Boyd (1976) famously argued, “generating a rapidly 
changing environment—that is, engaging in activity that is so quick it is disorienting and appears uncertain or 
ambiguous to the enemy—inhibits the adversary’s ability to adapt and causes confusion and disorder that, in 
turn, causes an adversary to overreact or underreact... [T]he message is that whoever can handle the quickest 
rate of change is the one who survives”.[26]  Boyd famously suggested that to win in an environment of high 
information density one has to manoeuvre at speed and therefore operate inside the Observe, Orient, Decide 
and Act (OODA) loop of your adversary. The weaponization of anonymous sharing platforms has arguably 
enabled ISIS to mass-disseminate propaganda while avoiding suppressive actions, an information equivalent 
of manoeuvre at speed, and therefore operate inside the OODA loop of its adversaries. Furthermore, as the 
authors have argued elsewhere, ISIS has successfully trialled using stigmergic swarming operations harnessing 
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multiple anonymous platforms to maintain its network structure.[27] 
Below, we focus on three case studies of anonymous online portals in order to illustrate their use by ISIS in 
establishing new channels of content dissemination and communication, as well as examine how these portals 
allowed ISIS to maintain an operational network structure.
Anonymous Platforms as Black Boxes
As discussed above, we believe that in order to understand how ISIS has managed to route around extensive 
account suspension operations waged against it on popular social media platforms it is necessary to examine 
the role played by anonymous sharing platforms with a conceptual toolkit informed by ANT.[28] From an 
ANT perspective, networks are populated by entities conceptualised as actants because they simultaneously 
act and are acted upon. Actants, whether human or nonhuman, always have agency, which here stands for 
the ability to force change, a detour, in the interactions between networks.[29] Agency, and action in turn, are 
always already the property of associations of human and nonhuman elements.[30] Accordingly, one of the 
main strengths of ANT is that it allows the tracing of actors in a network, based on their actual role in the flow 
of agency.[31]  
When examining the role played by an anonymous sharing platform within the wider ISIS network an ANT-
informed perspective makes no a priori difference between social or technical nodes in the network. All that it 
sees are entities actively performing a network. However, anonymous sharing platforms immediately stand out 
because they act as accelerators of information flows while making it harder to trace the logistics of how these 
flows are performed. In effect, they black-box certain elements of the network. In this context, the black box is 
a conceptual metaphor developed in ANT to describe network assemblages which function so well that their 
internal logistics are opaque from the outside.[32]  Black boxes are created through what ANT terms as ‘acts of 
translation’, in which actors are first enrolled in the network, and then work to stabilise it from the inside thus 
creating the appearance of a monolithic assemblage.[33] From the perspective of our case studies, the black box 
concept helps to understand how ISIS maintains its networking structure by adaptively shifting operations to 
less known online sharing portals. 
Opening a black box allows us to examine the ways in which “a variety of social aspects and technical elements 
are associated and come together as a durable whole”.[34] The notion of opening and examining a black box 
is possible, because when focusing on a black-boxed entity seemingly homogenous from the outside, ANT 
sees “processes, performances, socio-technical rituals, and enactments […] driven by the dynamics of making 
connections, of binding things together, of extending associations, of ‘translating’ and ‘enrolling’ actors into 
networks”.[35] The same could be said for the role of online sharing portals, mobile phone apps, and other 
technical assemblages enrolled in the networks of ISIS affiliates. 
When analysing the case studies below, it appears that ISIS is leveraging the stability and distributed nature of 
their relatively established communication networks to enlist new actants which in turn help in the emergence 
of new networks. Crucially, the relative opacity of less known cloud portals such as Justpaste.it and Sendvid.
com, coupled with the migration of already established distributed networks of ISIS affiliates, drawn to these 
platforms by their TOS, creates a black-boxing dynamic. Ironically, the operations degrading ISIS’s overt digital 
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capabilities on popular social media sites have resulted in the migration and development of this dynamic. That 
is, ISIS networks seem to have reacted to the degradation of their capabilities on popular social media networks 
and rapidly migrated to new anonymous portals. As Stern and Modi have pointed out, “terrorists respond to 
changes in their environments by changing their mission and changing their shape. What is important in such 
events is that information logistics is essential in disseminating messages of terror”.[36]
ISIS’s Black Boxes
1. Justpaste.it 
Justpaste.it is a free content sharing portal providing document storage and file sharing services under the motto 
of ‘sharing text and images the easy way’. The site is hosted by Cloud Flare and owned by Polish entrepreneur 
Mariusz Zurawek, who sums up justpaste.it as follows: “You are able to do what you want with almost two clicks. 
It doesn’t require registration, it isn’t searchable and access to specific content is only available via a link or if 
it makes the ‘most popular’ page”.[37] However, early 2014 ISIS has harnessed this service to disseminate its 
online videos, brutal images of beheadings, texts that aim to spread its radical ideology, and most importantly 
the controversial digital edition of the ISIS online magazine ‘Dabiq’. Since its emergence in July 2014, Dabiq was 
hosted by justpaste.it, and archive.org. The English language magazine ostensibly targets Western audiences to 
garner new recruits [Figures 2-4].
Figure 2: Dabiq Magazine issue hosted by justpaste.it [full url is obfuscated]
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Figure 3: Tweet with extreme content posted by ISIS members on justpaste.it [full url is obfuscated]
Figure 4: Tweet with material advertising migration to ISIS-held territory posted on justpaste.it 
[full url is obfuscated]
Justpaste.it not only allows ISIS to host the magazine but also offers a free folder share option which ISIS’s 
networked affiliates can use to share, store and disseminate information to global audiences. The platform offers 
advanced features such as pasting text directly from a word processor or a webpage, formatting and exporting 
to PDF, automatic importing of images, secure content publishing, secure SSL connection, and password-
protected access. To protect the contents of text notes from web crawlers the site allows the use of [encrypt] 
tags. Indeed, one of the most valuable options Justpaste.it offers is password protection for disseminated content 
which makes it a uniquely secure environment for exchanging messages or files. 
Describing the site’s appeal to users, Carmen Fishwick also pointed out the easy to use template working well 
even on slow internet connections.[38]  Justpaste.it, also has a mobile phone app with no interruptions from 
pop-ups or other advertising materials. 4 Leveraging these features, ISIS members and affiliates have utilized 
Justpaste.it to send encrypted messages, upload videos and files (such as jihadi materials, books, instructions), 
share information and upload online magazines. Links to content uploaded on the site have been shared via 
Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, and other social media platforms to increase participation for potential recruits, 
propaganda, and other logistical support. Overall, Justpaste.it appears to have proved helpful to ISIS affiliates, 
as folders and files can be widely shared by only copying a hybrid link allowing the file to be printed or read 
online. 
4  Writing formatting tools are also available for right-to-left languages (e.g. Arabic). No logon credentials are needed and the platform 
works on mobile phone devices (justpaste.it, 2014).
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Arguably, the pervasiveness of ISIS’ Dabiq and Romyiah magazines is indebted to the existence of this sharing 
portal. Interestingly, files uploaded to justpaste.it can be deleted under the TOS agreement, according to 
Justpaste TOS:
- Any material posted anonymously will be deleted after five days.
- Any content that may spread hate or cause harm will be removed instantly. 
Fishwick underlines how the anonymity of justpaste.it served ISIS, noting that “JustPaste.it’s role in Islamic 
state’s propaganda machine has largely gone unnoticed”.[39] All the images uploaded to the service by ISIS 
members have details of a related Twitter account stamped on them. The user’s Twitter handle is also printed 
at the bottom of each image, so reporters have been crediting the images to Twitter. The use of justpaste.it by 
ISIS members has brought international attention to the site as the traffic approached 10 million page views a 
month [Figure 5].
Figure 5: Justpaste.it traffic. Source: http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/justpaste.it
According to Google Analytics (2015), “the platform has about 2.5 million unique users a month, which works 
out at about 10 million views every month”.5 Zurawek, the site’s founder, started seeing what he called “a large 
growth” of traffic to his website from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. The site makes it easy to publish text, 
photos or PDFs, and at the beginning of 2014 rebels and civilians in Syria discovered JustPaste.it and began 
using it to post news. But sometime over the summer of 2014, Jacob Silverman notes, “jihadists discovered 
it as well, and the site soon became one of the favoured tools of the Islamic State for sharing news, official 
communiques, and graphic propaganda”.[40]
5  As justpaste.it tweeted on 12/Aug/2014. See, https://twitter.com/justpasteit/status/499153334377660417
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As stated by its founder, the site “does not compete with advanced online text editors, such as Google Docs or 
Microsoft Office 365, but rather creates a place that is extremely easy and simple to use. It’s similar to Pastebin, 
the service popular with hackers, but with image files too”.[41] As the activity of ISIS on Justpaste.it drew 
the attention of authorities in the United Kingdom, the police requested the site delete content including all 
videos showing graphic executions at the hands of ISIS, as well as all pro-ISIS propaganda. In combating ISIS’ 
use of his service, Zurawek commented: “It’s not my choice that ISIS has selected my site [...] As long as I’m 
cooperating with the police, removing content, and not allowing ISIS to make propaganda, I think it’s good for 
the site that many people will know about it”.[42]  
The architecture of justpaste.it, coupled with the possibility of using VPNs and TOR to obfuscate IP addresses 
makes it hard to ban specific users.[43] Nevertheless, the site appears to have made an effort to police the 
content uploaded by users and actively remove extremist materials. In response, an ISIS affiliate - Abo-Taloot 
al-Khrasani - messaged Zurawek to condemn the site’s efforts to police uploaded content. This demonstrates 
how significant the platform is to ISIS in maintaining its communication and dissemination structure.  In the 
letter below the author claims that 70% of justpase.it traffic is ISIS content [Figure 6].
Figure 6: A copy of letter sent by Abo Talout al-Khurasani to Zurawek (source: justpaste.it)
2. Sendvid.com
Sendvid is an instant video upload portal used by ISIS to route around wide account suspension and content 
deletion on YouTube and Daily Motion. Specifically, ISIS media production outlets such as Al-Hayat, al-Furqan, 
and al-Etisam extensively used the video uploading portal in their propaganda dissemination. High-definition 
quality videos such as Flames of War, Message Covered with Blood, and Healing of the Hearts were first uploaded 
to Sendvid, and then popularized virally through Twitter follower networks.  A simple search for Sendvid on 
Twitter returns mostly links to ISIS propaganda videos.  Sendvid is a crucial element of ISIS’s information 
logistics as videos linked to Sendvid can also be shared via other social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, 
archive.org, Tumblr, Telegram, dump.to and e-mail, or can be stored in users’ Google drive or Dropbox for 
future retrieval. 
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Sendvid has been used by ISIS affiliates early 2015 to widely copy and aggregate propaganda materials, thus 
building publicly available collections of terrorist-related content. As Remzy Mahzam points out, “the electronic 
digitisation of the extremist identity of ISIS has been made effective through its frequent injection of videos, 
incessant release of periodicals and downloading of visual reports in multiple languages, eventually building up 
a digital compendium that will remain accessible for future generations for reference”.[44] Furthermore, unlike 
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, where admins are alerted to remove both jihadi content and the associated 
accounts, Sendvid is a safely unpoliced archiving platform where data can be uploaded anonymously even 
under false Facebook, Twitter or Google accounts.  
The following appears to be the standard reply to enquiries regarding jihadi content by the Sendvid Support 
Team: “Thank you for contacting us regarding this matter. As a service provider, we try to promote freedom 
of speech and remain as neutral as possible to all groups regardless of their views. With that being said, we do 
work with several foreign and domestic agencies in removing videos that we deem to be in violation of our 
Terms of Service. If you encounter any videos that violate our TOS, we encourage you to report them to our 
abuse department at: abuse@sendvid.com”. In theory, all online sharing portals have very much the same TOS 
in regard to removing videos or documents promoting violence. Sendvid’s TOS are quite clear that the service 
does not allow “adult, obscene, illegal or objectionable content”, and that “accounts and content that violate this 
will be removed without warning”. In practice, Sendvid host these videos unless explicitly notified of breach of 
TOS. Most of the gruesome videos uploaded by ISIS are in fact still available on the Sendvid service, and are 
freely shared on Twitter [Figure7 - 8]. 
Figure 7: Video titled ‘The happiness of almojahideen’ posted to Sendvid. 
93ISSN  2334-3745 February 2018
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 12, Issue 1
Figure 8: Sendvid links to ISIS content, titled: message to the tyrants of Jordan.
Interestingly, recently Sendvid has become a preferred site for pornographic materials, which appears to have 
caused ISIS affiliates to reduce their presence as this contradicts with Islamic Sharia values. 
3. Dump.to
Dump.to is an online sharing platform with no login credentials,6 using archive.is as a web carrier. The sharing 
portal also has no clear TOS policies that govern dissemination of content. The importance of this service 
in the context of ISIS is that it allows users to share, upload and converge links from similar sharing sites 
such as justpast.it and sendvid.com where all types of data can be stored and shared via link to ISIS’ affiliate 
networks. Dump.to allows documents, video, voice messages, and music to be stored and shared, which in 
turn allows ISIS affiliates to aggregate, edit, curate, re-classify, and re-publish jihadi propaganda content. In 
addition, content shared on the site can be protected by password, and be commented on and edited by anyone 
using a pseudonym or anonymously. Most importantly, the lack of policing and governance makes Dump.to a 
vital medium for information sharing among jihadists, who can communicate in the open through encrypted 
messages posted directly through the site’s interface. 
The site hosts most of ISIS’ online video propaganda content, as well as jihadi music (nasheed), Dabiq magazine 
links, and extreme jihadi books. For example, most of ISIS’s controversial books such as Hijra to the Islamic state 
(migrating to ISIS land) and How to Survive in the West were available to download for free, arguably helping 
ISIS to recruit western affiliates and encouraging migration to ISIS-controlled territories (Figures 9-14).
6  Dump.to is registered to a German company operating behind the kasserver.com domain
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Figure 9: iBRABO highlights the use of dump.to by ISIS 
Figure 10: Jihadi training materials, books, and propaganda
Figure 11: Dabiq propaganda magazine on Dump.to web addresses
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Figure 12: Dump.to hosts Welayat news 
Figure 13: Some significant dumps by Al Hayat media centre (news reports, breaking news)
Figure 14: ISIS breaking news shared instantly on Dump.to
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Dump.to considers itself a free and anonymous publishing platform that never takes responsibility for content 
being published. Typical of similar sharing portals, Dump.to TOS claim to prevent content or material 
containing child pornography, phishing & malware, violent threats, spam campaigns, private and confidential 
information, invasion of privacy.7
Discussion
As their presence started to fade on Twitter and YouTube as a result of the globally coordinated filtering campaign, 
ISIS decided to move the primary hub of their information operations to anonymous sharing portals such as 
Telegram, Justpaste.it, Sendvid.com, and Dump.to. This was a strategic decision, as these sites transitioned 
from being auxiliary platforms to primary communication and dissemination channels in ISIS’s strategy. The 
characteristics and typology of these anonymous sharing portals, ready templates, easy video uploads and 
mobile phone supported applications created participatory media environments where information can be 
accessed across multiple social media networks. It is estimated that Justpaste.it, Sendvid.com and Dump.to 
portals have contributed around 20% of information disseminated by ISIS to Twitter alone (Figure 15). 
Figure 15: Detrimental Use of Social Media by Daesh. An Information Warfare Perspective 
Source:  Joseph Shasheen, ‘Detrimental Use of Social Media and the Case of Daesh: An Information Warfare Perspective’, Riga Strategic 
Communication Dialogue: Perception Matters, August 2015.
7 An enquiry about ISIS’ use of Dump.to services leads to the following standard reply from the company:
Dear visitor,
We are sorry that you have found improper content in our network. Please note that in order to process your abuse report and 
protect our users’ privacy and integrity, we request that you provide a photo ID (ID/Driving License/Passport/...) within 24 
hours by replying to this email.
NOTE: Your report will automatically be rejected if you do not submit the requested documents
Dump.To team.
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To an extent, these new sharing portals empower ISIS’s message by enhancing connectivity in the network and 
by adding more actors to its structure. From an ANT perspective, these new sharing portals serve as information 
intermediaries, allowing for fluid and anonymous information aggregation, curation, and dispersal. Publicly 
available, no-login anonymity allows links and content to be aggregated and mass-distributed continuously 
and with variable dynamic intensity based on ad-hoc requirements. These platform architectures allowed ISIS 
to maintain its flow of information, enlist new actors, and leverage its distributed affiliate and sympathizer 
networks to reach and mobilize potential jihadists around the world. Furthermore, as we suggested above, 
anonymous sharing platforms play a key role in the ongoing information warfare waged by ISIS. By using 
anonymous sharing platforms as black boxes in its information network, ISIS was able to route around 
social media account suspensions, and leverage these platforms as strategic information weapons serving its 
information operation objectives.
Importantly, as Krieger and Belliger point out, enhancing connectivity across the network generates information 
flows that are “increasingly difficult to control and steer”.[45] It can be argued that anonymous sharing portals 
such as Sendvid.com, Justpast.it and Dump.to, “consisting neither of objects nor subjects, but actors and 
mediators”,[46] act as enabling black box media hubs in ISIS’ sinformation operation strategy.
In examining the TOS policies of social media networks and anonymous sharing portals in relation to ISIS use 
of their services, we found out that the financial capabilities and reputation of Twitter, Facebook and Google 
motivated them to take immediate actions against jihadi content.  Meanwhile, the three anonymous sharing 
portals we examined have the overriding aim of expanding their user-base, and seem to have extremely limited 
resources to track down content disseminated by ISIS or other extremist networks who seek an easy, secure 
and fast medium of communication. The lack of resources makes policing and active removal of ISIS content 
prohibitively expensive to the proprietors of these platforms.
Moreover, as already mentioned, the coordinated campaign to police Twitter and YouTube for jihadist content 
has forced ISIS to shift its focus towards using anonymous sharing portals as primary tools for aggregation 
and dissemination of propaganda content. The anonymous functionality of these portals acts as a black box, 
obfuscating the logistics of ISIS’s global propaganda network. When coupled with the ability to create hybrid 
weblinks and PDF files, which then can be disseminated across most social media, these platforms enable the 
rapid redistribution of content even under conditions of drastic policing and filtering. Even though anonymous 
sharing portals seem to have intensified their efforts to remove ISIS-related content, this does not solve the 
underlying problem as ISIS affiliates can still use these services as aggregators for content advertised on other 
anonymous social media platforms such as Telegram.
Conclusion
This article is a first step in examining the role of anonymous sharing portals in relation to the dissemination 
of ISIS propaganda and network communication in the aftermath of the global ISIS-related content degrading 
operation orchestrated by the most popular social media platforms. Our aim was to highlight the significance 
of anonymous sharing portals in terms of ISIS’s propaganda campaign.  We argued that anonymous sharing 
portals acted as black boxes for ISIS-related propaganda content, helping terror networks to sustain high-
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intensity information flows and maintain global communication channels. The emergence of these portals has 
fundamentally changed the way ISIS distributes its propaganda globally, in that these platforms allow terror 
networks safe aggregation and the ability to disseminate content links rapidly across popular social media 
without suffering from efforts to degrade the network. This in turn has enabled terror networks to maintain 
global information operations even in the face of coordinated efforts at policing and filtering. 
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